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1. Do you agree with the view that India’s interaction with Central Asia (CA) 
has a paradox. There is a long history of continuous flow of peoples and ideas 
between the two regions but today India is certainly not among the most 
important players there.  
India is clearly not a major player in Central Asia, although it has the potential to 
evolve into a power comparable to China or even the United States. It has some “soft 
power” to capitalize on. Its political system is the most democratic in South Asia 
(although for the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia this is a feature that frightens 
much more than attracts them). Some Indian universities and technical institutes are 
quite competitive at the global level. In sum, intellectually and culturally, India has 
strong foundations to become a power to be reckoned with. However, India’s “hard 
power” does not match that of China. On the brighter side, while India’s ability, on 
paper at least, to influence Central Asians’ hearts and minds is much more manifest 
than that of China, the latter is, on the contrary, a distrusted emerging power and its 
newly-gained allies, in Africa, South East Asia or Latin America, are still uneasy with 
China’s style of diplomacy and economic relations. Except in Pakistan, suspicion 
towards India is almost non-existent across the world.  
The Chinese leadership knows it well. Despite China's growing political and economic 
strength, the country suffers from a lack of the magnetic attraction. China is able to 
challenge the Americans economically, while the country is increasingly stronger 
militarily. But it is still extremely difficult for Beijing to make Chinese culture, polity 
and society more appealing to outsiders, a goal that is necessary if it wants to shape a 
friendly attitude towards China. This failure has a significant negative impact on 
China’s drive towards superpower status and its rivalry with the U.S. This is a window 
of opportunity for India.  
2. Do you believe India has to shed the current approach of understanding 
Central Asia steadfastly through a Western prism? The practice has obscured 
rather than clarified its interests, it is said.  
First of all, generally speaking, India does not display great quality in its strategic and 
tactical thinking and analysis. In the 21s century, influence on, and cooperation with, 
other states are mostly achieved through commercial agreements and foreign 




Central Asian countries totaled $25.9 billion in 2009, up from $527 million in 1992. 
India’s trade with the same countries is ridiculously low at around $450 in 2009. 
Globalization has reduced the importance of regional “civilizational” influence or the 
role of religions or philosophies as a means to expand a state’s influence. All comes 
down to business practices and commercial opportunities. China is not trying to sell its 
“economic model” and its ancestral philosophies to the rest of the world. It strictly 
focuses on the economic realm. And its strategy has brought impressive success 
because it understands the world “through a Western prism,” that is, the nation-state 
model organized by the rule of law. India should continue and enhance its “Extended 
Neighbourhood Policy” towards Central Asia, organize more state official visit to the 
region, put forward multilateral and bilateral cooperation agreements in terms of 
development aid and technical support  
India has to act very quickly, though; otherwise it will be definitely overtaken by the 
rapid changes in Central Asia. At the moment the U.S., Japan and Australia have 
governments which do not consider India as a serious emerging power. “Chindia” has 
been evacuated from talks at the higher levels. Trade and technological innovation 
matters more than “civilizational” influence.  
3.Why the stability and security of CA is of prime importance for India, which 
it considers part of its extended neighbourhood?  
For basically three reasons: drug trafficking, terrorism (Mumbai attack) and energy 
projects.  
What happens in Central Asia matters to India for basically three reasons. First, 
Central Asia is part of a dangerous neighborhood, including Afghanistan. Second, the 
other great powers (Russia and the U.S.) have military bases in Central Asia which 
provide support and reinforcement to the Russian presence in the region and to U.S. 
actions in Afghanistan. Third, Central Asia is of interest, because of its proximity and 
history, to both Russia and China. If those two powers are interested in any Central 
Asian country, the U.S. has to be. The U.S. base at Manas, Kyrgyzstan is near the 
Chinese border. A power vacuum or significant disorder would be a threat to U.S. 
interests in Kyrgyzstan and the region.  
But more importantly, the region is inhabited mostly by Muslims. The escalation of the 
“Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) – now renamed the “war against al-Qaeda” under 
the Obama administration – into “the long war,” and its dangerous spillover effects, 
legitimize, at least in the eyes of Washington, the consolidation and open-ended 
duration of U.S. armed forces presence in Kyrgyzstan and more generally Central Asia. 
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The infiltration of drugs and armed militants into Central Asia has transformed the 
region into a fertile ground of instability, a centre of transnational organized criminal 
activity. Moreover, Central Asia’s physical centrality makes it vulnerable to spillover 
instability to India and Pakistan. It is now increasingly encapsulated by an intertwined 
web of terrorist networks: Russia’s Chechens and Dagestani to the north, China’s 
Uighurs to the east, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al Qaeda, and 
various other terrorist groups to the south.  
Southern Central Asia, in particular, with its close historical and trade links to 
Afghanistan, now serves as a vital conduit from Afghanistan and increasingly a focal 
point for the training and basing of militant terrorist groups. At the heart of Central 
Asia’s security crisis is the Fergana Valley. Since the late 1990s this region has been 
fervently contested by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and has endured 
continuous armed clashes, led by the IMU through raids and terrorist attacks, 
including car bombings, full-scale village assaults and the kidnapping of foreigners. 
Aiming to spearhead global jihadism, this militant group seeks to establish a 
transnational caliphate starting with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and ultimately 
expanding beyond the periphery of Central Asia’s Muslim regions. India with its 
important Muslim population (the second most important after Indonesia) could 
become vulnerable to Islamic activism.  
4 What are the Implications of the role of International actors in CA for 
India? Has India joined in the ‘New Great Game” being played out in CA?  
India is only starting to step up its involvement in Central Asia. It has not joined the 
new “Great game.” While India considers itself as an equal to China with regards to 
power projection in Asia, China regards India as a regional Asian power and wants to 
limit its influence to its immediate neighborhood. The recent visit of President Obama 
to China has been perceived by many observers as confirmation of the idea that China 
and the Obama administration see a limited regional role for India. China’s domination 
in Central Asia has been acknowledged by Washington; India cannot aspire, at least in 
the medium term, to have a status on par with China. On the other hand, because of 
its vast extension of its land borders, India is well position to impact on Central Asian 
states, and this is certainly taken into account in Washington, Moscow and Beijing. The 
Americans could take advantage of India’s fast economic rise to achieve their 
objectives in Asia. FPRC Journal-10 India and Central Asia  
 
 
5. The US urges India to expand its influence, saying India has the potential 
to positively shape the future of CA. How the US and India can co-operate for 
peace and security in CA?  
Security in that part of the world is strongly linked with economic growth and social 
development. The “New Silk Road” is one project that has the potential to bring more 
economic activities in Central Asia. It aims at developing links, first, between Asian 
countries, then, with their neighbors, and finally with Western Europe. It emphasizes 
the construction of land transport linkages within Eurasia. At the end of the 1990s 
India’s prime minister intensively promoted this idea and insisted that it held 
promising perspectives in terms of interregional economic development. India has a 
huge expertise in railway transportation, while Central Asian states have a lack of it. 
Since the U.S. backs this project and contributes to it financially and technically, India 
can only be interested in coordinating its efforts with those of the Americans as it is 
the best way to maintain peace and stability in Central Asia and to fight the three evils 
of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.  
The Americans are impressed by the high level of India’s pluralism which has kept al 
Qaeda out of its Muslim community. They are equally amazed by the strength of 
India’s democracy and stability. They want India to emerge as a pole of attraction for 
Central Asian states, partly to counter the growing influence of China.  
6. Russia remains the critical balancer in the Central Asian competition, and 
significant advantages will accrue to India depending on its relationships 
with Russia. How far do you agree with this statement?  
Even though India has had good relations with Russia over the last few decades, this 
will not be translated into significant benefits with regards to Central Asia. Russia 
wants to keep Central Asia for itself for different reasons. First, its cultural and 
linguistic influence in these ex-Soviet republics is still quite prominent and will remain 
so for many more years. Second, it badly needs to remain a transit country for the 
export of central Asian gas and oil. The revenues generated by this situation are 
crucial for Russia’s internal development and its political and strategic influence in 
Central Asia. However, Russia's monopoly on the transport of hydrocarbons from 
Central Asia to external (European, Chinese, South Asian) markets has been destroyed 
by China and the EU. Almost all Central Asian states have expressed their willingness 
to escape from the Kremlin’s domination in the FPRC Journal-10 India and 
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energy sector, triggering some panic in Moscow and making the West and China – and 
India – optimistic about the odds of tapping into Central Asian energy resources.  
Where does the Russian advantage lie in this “Great Game” over gas and oil supplies? 
It lies in the fact that the Kremlin – as well as Beijing – does not embarrass itself with 
defending democratic or “civilizational” values in its foreign policy, and in its relations 
with foreign partners. As such, Russian foreign policy parameters are in line with most 
petro states in the world. It goes without saying that democracy and hydrocarbon 
wealth have a proven history of uneasy coexistence. Democracy does not marry well 
with oil and gas wealth. Russia can swiftly make oil and gas deals with a country like 
Kazakhstan because policymakers in both countries understand each other quite well. 
Russian political authorities will never make democracy or human rights respect an 
issue in their negotiation with Astana. India does not have this “privilege.” Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan know that their “black gold” and gas are most wanted 
by the West. However, the West has constantly to make it a point that there's large 
room for improvement in these countries’ record on election transparency and the rule 
of law. Such demands outright annoy autocrats’ regime.  
7. Are India and China looking to redeploy their rivalry on the Central Asian 
and Afghan theaters on a geopolitical, but also political and economic level?  
As long as India is almost totally absent in the ex-Soviet Central Asian states, the 
answer is no. As to Afghanistan, China and India are at the moment and will continue 
to be rivals over the routes the future pipelines will take.  
In its approach to the Central Asia Beijing considers the potential reaction of other 
actors, including the U.S., EU, Japan, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Iran, whose 
interests are still paramount in the region, especially in terms of energy security. 
Nonetheless, China's interests are, on some issues, more numerous and specific than 
those of these other stakeholders. Thus, besides the obvious interest in having access 
to Caspian oil and Kazakh uranium, Central Asia is also critical to China’s strategic 
interests, as the stability of this large region, especially its western border, is seen as 
a safeguard for China, which will prevent any hostile developments taking place in the 
region. There are perceived threats from the presence of other major FPRC Journal-
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powers, primarily the U.S., in the area and the actions of Uighur organizations, which 
have many cross-border linkages. In addition, China wants to promote and maintain 
economic synergies with neighboring countries, strengthening the role of Xinjiang as a 
regional pole in Eurasia and as a driver of economic development through, inter alia, 
strengthening its role as a center for logistics and energy redistribution, which may 
bring about the eventual establishment of a free trade area including much or all of 
Central Asia. The actions and interests of Beijing can be grouped into five dimensions: 
border, Uighur, commercial, energy and geopolitical issues.  
8. Do you agree with the view that India’s main regional interests in Central 
Asia are Pakistan and energy security?  
To some extent, yes. Geopolitical and economic factors account for New Delhi’s 
maintenance of good relations with Central Asian states. From a strategic standpoint, 
an Indo-Central Asian alliance could bring about the closing of ranks against Pakistan. 
Pakistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, are potential enemies in the sense 
that the two Central Asian states fear a spread of Islamic fundamentalism originating 
from Pakistan. If Kabul further falls under the influence of Pakistan after the 
announced U.S. withdrawal in 2014, this danger will seriously increase. A rising 
Pakistan would be counterproductive to enhancing India’s geostrategic interest in 
Central – and Southwest – Asia. Hence India must rapidly develop relations with the 
region, not only to satisfy its growing energy demand but also to prevent the ex-
Soviet republics from forging stronger bonds with Pakistan on the basis of their shared 
Islamic heritage.  
Despite the fact that Islamabad sees the recent trade and military agreement between 
India and Afghanistan as a manifestation of a policy of encirclement, in recent months 
there has been a tentative improvement in relations between the two neighbors. India 
intends to maintain its own policy towards Pakistan, independent of Washington, on 
the basis of its own vested interests. Islamabad has recently secured most-favored-
nation status with India – an economic provision deriving from the rules of the World 
Trade Organization – although there are many internal pressures pulling it in the 
opposite direction. There are small signs of an improvement in their relations in 
general, but there are many problems as well, among which is Islamabad’s failing to 
respond to Indian requests for it to carry out thorough investigation into the 2008 
Mumbai attacks and to break Pakistan’s links with the architect of the attacks, the 
Lashkar-e-Toiba.  
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Many people in Central Asian states see India as a potential pawn in their negotiations 
(and games) with China, Russia and other major players in the region. India’s 
emerging energy foreign policy is competing with China’s. One can expect greater 
cooperation between New Delhi and Central Asia, especially in the military sector, in 
the form of joint counter-insurgency operations to protect the western border. 
Transfers of military equipment have been significantly on the rise in the last three 
years between India and Central Asia. India’s stronger presence in the region is quite 
possible since the most regional states have made it a priority to diversify their foreign 
partners and expand their diplomatic activities. Concretely, it has allowed Central 
Asian region regimes to be courted by Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the EU and other 
important players in East and South East Asia, so as to lessen their reliance on China. 
India will undoubtedly continue to knock at Central Asia’s door in the years to come 
with the hope of establishing a stronger presence in this resource-rich region.  
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